1	The question here is what is a mind and its relationship to the body. There
2	are two sides to this conundrum. On the one hand is dualism, the notion that our
3	body is one thing and the mind a ghostly thing. On the other hand we have
4	materialism, the notion that our mind is physical and we're just what we appear to
5	be, a material object. I tend to lean towards the dualism side, but both sides have
6	their problems to consider, so I'm really torn between both sides on this question.
7	Crick presents us with the argument for materialism. His main thesis can be
8	summed up by stating that we're nothing but a pack of neurons (Crick, 86).
9	Materialism, put simply, is the claim that the mind is a material thing. Many people
10	take this to mean that the mind is the brain. He has termed this the Astonishing
11	Hypothesis (Crick, 86). He suggests a few reasons why we consider this so
12	astonishing. First we're reluctant to accept the idea "that a complex system can be
13	explained by the behavior of its parts and their interactions with each other" (Crick,
14	86). This is the main method behind the development of modern sciences (Crick,
15	87). Secondly the nature of consciousness hinders our acceptance of this thesis
16	(Crick, 87). For one, if zombies (people whose minds aren't really controlling their
17	bodies) don't need a mind why do we have one? The deep issues of qualia (ie: do we
18	both really see the same color that we call "red"), and that of why a brain can be
19	conscience but not a brick, also hinder our sight of this thesis. Lastly, free will
20	complicates our sight as well (Crick, 88). So in all Crick has demonstrated
21	materialism, but I don't wholly accept these views as they contradict our notion of
22	being more than animals.

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Clark's short piece on extending minds is worth noting because it is what shows the extreme of the view Crick describes. Clark's thesis is that our minds aren't confined to our brains, and extend to modern technology. He looks at the mind as a processor, and since we use computers to process information and solve problems then he says the mind can be extended into these devices that do more of that for us. This is a mind meant for functioning. These ideas make Crick look more within the spectrum then he initially did. For our purposes here Clark is used as evidence of just why we do naturally think of ourselves as dualists.

Descartes holds our only look at the dualism side. His overall thesis is that we are our minds and thus bodies we can do without (Descartes, 82). The mind is all we can be sure of as our senses may be lying to us. Though mind and body are separate they're closely related (Descartes, 82). Senses cross between the two, and nothing impedes our mind's ability to control our body. The body is divisible while the mind is not, yet our mind can have distinct personalities (Descartes, 82). He holds that our bodies, that are nothing but vegetables without our minds, are machines controlled by our minds (Descartes, 83). This is the main argument dualism has against materialism. The strongest argument for this is that of zombies. These views I tend to lean towards, but really my conclusions are mixed.

Bloom provides an interesting twist to this question as a whole more than just one side of it. He gets us to question the extent to which we think we may be dualists or materialists but in reality truly be just materialists. Young children, he has tested, seem to treat reality in the materialist sense, but as they get older (acquainted with religion?) they see themselves and other humans as dualists

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46	(Bloom 205). Our born nature shows that we don't think of anything as more than
47	what it appears; this leads to materialism. But the growth that we foster in children
48	and the educational institutions enforce leads us all to at least believe in dualism,
49	even if we're truly just materialists.
50	In the end I still lean towards dualism, even though it is worth questioning
51	how something that isn't technically part of the body can control the body. At the
52	same time, though, I do realize that at a tangible level we are nothing more than
53	what is visible as our bodies. So materialism could be accurate, it just makes
54	answering large philosophical and theological questions easier if we can believe in
55	dualism. After all, the primal issue of consciousness does put a crack in the whole
56	materialism way of thinking about ourselves.
57	
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